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The proportional elections held in Brazil in 1998 and 2002 display identical statis-
tical signatures. In particular, the distribution of votes among candidates includes
a power-law regimen. We suggest that the rationale behind this robust scaling in-
variance is a multiplicative process in which the voter’s choice for a candidate is
governed by a product of probabilities.
The election is a fundamental democratic process and the vote certainly represents the
most effective instrument for regular citizens to promote significant changes in their commu-
nities. General elections in Brazil are held every four years, when citizens vote for executive
(president and state governors) as well as legislative (congressmen and state deputies) man-
dates. Voting is compulsory and ballots are collected in electronic voting machines. Pre-
viously, we reported a statistical analysis of the Brazilian 1998 elections showing that the
proportional voting process for state deputies displayed scale invariance [1]. It was shown
that the distribution of the number of candidates N receiving a fraction of votes v followed a
power-law N(v) ∼ vα, where α ≈ −1, extending over two orders of magnitude. The striking
similarity in the distribution of votes in all states, regardless of large diversities in social
and economical conditions in different regions of the country, was taken as an indication
of a common mechanism in the decision process. The issue was raised, however, that this
uniformity in behavior could be due to some peculiarity of the political rules valid at that
moment. In 1998, the legislation allowed party alliances of all sorts, not necessarily repro-
duced from state to state and independent from the majority candidatures. Since then, the
National Congress has approved new political rules. Any alliance of parties supporting a
presidential candidate should be reproduced in all states with restrictions on the campaigns
for Congress and local representation.
On October 6, 2002, 115,253,432 electors from Brazil’s 27 states chose from among 4,210
candidates for federal and 11,717 for state deputies. The collection of ballots was entirely
electronic, thus permitting a very rapid count and publication of the results [2]. We apply the
2same statistical treatment given to the results of the 1998 election for congressmen and state
deputies. Votes for the candidates are normalized by the number of voters in their respective
states. We then rank the candidate by his/her normalized number of votes and perform the
statistics for the whole country. This is justified by the aforementioned compatibility found
in the results of 1998 for each state, and verified again for the 2002 election.
Figures 1(a) and (b) are the log-log plots of the voting distribution N(v) using data of
all candidates in Brazil competing for positions of state and federal deputies, respectively.
The voting distributions for 1998 and 2002 are almost identical for both types of candidates.
Furthermore, in all cases we can identify a well-defined region where the voting distributions
follow a 1/v behaviour. The remarkable similarity between the statistics of the 1998 and 2002
results, despite significant modifications of the electoral rules, indicates that the processes
behind a voting decision are largely insensitive to external factors. We argue that this is a
manifestation of a multiplicative relation of independent factors influencing the choice of the
elector. The voting fraction v of a candidate can be viewed as a “grand-process” depending
on the successful completion of a number n of independent “sub-processes”. Each sub-
process could be associated with the characteristics of a given candidate or with his/her
position on a particular political, social or economical issue. We can then link to each
candidate a probability pi of performing sub-process i, so that his/her voting fraction is
v = p1p2 · · · pn. Assuming that the pi’s are independent random variables, and considering
n sufficiently large we find, from the Central Limit Theorem, that the distribution of v
should be approximately log-normal. If the statistical dispersion of the data is large enough,
the log-normal distribution can “mimic” the 1/v profile over a given range of values [3].
Deviations at small and large values of v are expected to be due to finite size effects.
The statistical analyses of the 1998 and 2002 Brazilian elections indicate that the voting
distribution is highly reproducible. It displays features of a “scale-free” phenomenon [4, 5, 6]
where the governing decision-making mechanism can be adequately modeled in terms of a
multiplicative process [3]. A candidate for the National Congress or for the State Houses is
likely to be known by the voters through the media. When instruments of information are
absent or ignored, the voting decision is probably determined by direct communication with
friends, relatives, etc. In the case of municipal elections, for instance, the physical proximity
of candidates and voters creates a different framework from the one found for state and
federal elections. We performed the same data analysis to the results of Brazilian municipal
3elections held in 2000. No clear indication of power-law behaviour was found even for the
most populated cities.
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FIG. 2: (a) Double logarithmic plot of the voting distribution for state deputies in 1998 (circles)
and 2002 (triangles). The solid lines are the least-squares fits to the data in the scaling regions.
The numbers indicate the scaling exponent . (b) The same as in (a) but for federal deputies.
